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NOTES
return can ultimately be determined only by permitting the new carrier
to operate. The effect of a given rate upon traffic and income cannot
be finally discovered until the rate is put into operation. Postponing
agency action in these situations may facilitate accumulation of some ad-
ditional facts, but will not obviate the necessity to speculate when a de-
cision is eventually made.
The distinguishing feature of the RCA case, then, is that agency
action based on speculation foreclosed rather than fostered further ex-
perimentation. There is thus no ready-made formula which can be
applied with equal propriety in passing upon all eventualities. When this
predicament presents itself the final judgment must be adapted to the
circumstances of the particular case. The Supreme Court's approach to
this perplexing problem is perhaps defensible because of its reluctance
to interfere with administrative judgment. However, administrative
agencies should be extremely cautious in their reliance upon predictions
when functioning in this problematic area.
The American Airlines case cannot fairly be said to represent a
departure from principles governing this realm of the regulatory process.
The significance of -the opinion lies in its flexible and practical approach
to the operation of the administrative system. There is no reason to
believe that the decision is an invitation to regulatory agencies to discard
traditional methods of supporting conclusions. The resort to intelligent
speculation remains a necessity to sound prospective action, rather than
an expedient for the avoidance of the factual core present in all situa-
tions confronting the administrative process.
WARRANTIES TO A PAYOR OR ACCEPTOR UNDER
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-417 (1)
Endeavoring to erect a basic legal structure upon which business
transactions can be predicated, the draftsmen of the proposed Uniform
Commercial Code have not only reiterated many concepts previously in-
corporated in uniform commercial acts, other statutes, and judicial de-
cisions, but they have also introduced numerous significant innovations.1
The aggregate of these provisions purports to simplify, modernize, and
consolidate the entire body of rules of commercial law. As the Nego-
1. References to sections of the Code are to the Final Text Edition (November,
1951), as approved by the American Law Institute, the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws, and the House of Delegates of the American Bar
Association; references to comments by the Commissioners are to the Proposed Final
Draft (Spring, 1950).
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tiable Instruments Law stimulated legal scholars to debate its merits and
shortcomings, so the Code has provoked scholarly disputation. 2
Article Three of the Code deals with commercial paper. Among the
most important innovations introduced by Article Three is a recasting of
the remedies of a drawee against persons who obtain payment or ac-
ceptance of negotiable instruments. Basic to an understanding of the
import of the Code provisions is a knowledge of the steps through which
negotiable instruments payable to order pass in their journey to the
drawee. The check is representative of these instruments. The drawer
delivers the check to the payee, usually in satisfaction of an account due.
The payee may present the check to the drawee for immediate payment
or he may deposit it in his bank, which would thrust it into the bank
collection process, or he may obtain cash by negotiating the check to
one who would become a holder in due course.3 The holder might, in
turn, transfer the instrument to another purchaser; such transmission can
be repeated, but ultimately a holder will present the check to the drawee
for payment. At any stage of this procedure the check may be presented
2. Professor Ames led the critics of the NIL, while Judge Brewster, who super-
vised drafting of the Act, was its most stalwart supporter. Ames, The Negotiable
Instruntents Law, 14 HARv, L. Rxv. 241 (1900); Ames, The Negotiable Instruments
Law. A Word More, 14 HAzv. L. REv. 442 (1901) ; Ames, The Negotiable Instruments
Law-Necessary Amendnents, 16 HARv. L. REv. 255 (1903); Brewster, A Defense of
the Negotiable Instruments Law, 10 YALE L.J. 84 (1901) ; Brewster, The Negotiable
Instruments Law-A Rejoinder to Dean Ames, 15 HAv. L. REv. 26 (1901).
Similarly, Professor Beutel is outspoken in his criticism of the Code, while
Professor Gilmore, one of its draftsmen, has defended it. Beutel, The Proposed Uniform
Commercial Code as a Problem in Codification, 16 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 141 (1951);
Beutel, Comparison of the Proposed Commercial Code, Art. 3, and the Negotiable
Instruments Law, 30 NE. L. REv. 531 (1951); Beutel, The Proposed Uniform [?]
Commercial Code Should Not Be Adopted, 61 YALE L.J. 334 (1952); Gilmore, On1
the Dificulties of Codifying Commercial Law, 57 YALE L.J. 1341 (1948); Gilmore,
The Secured Transaction Article of the Commercial Code, 16 LAw & CONTLrtP. PROB.
27 (1951) ; Gilmore, The Uniform Commercial Code: A Reply to Professor Beutel,
61 YALE L.J. 364 (1952).
See also Corbin, The Uniform Commercial Code-Sales; Should It Be Enacted?,
59 YALE L.J. 821 (1950); Dunham, The New Commercial Code, 55 Com. L.J. 197
(1950); Goodrich, Proposed Uniform Commercial Code, 50 Com. L.J. 293 (1945);
Lewis, Proposed New Comimercial Code, 20 PA. BAR Ass'N Q. 131 (1949); Llewellyn
Problems of Codifying Security Law, 13 LAw & CoNTEIr. PROB. 687 (1948) ; Williston,
The Law of Sales in the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code, 63 HARv. L. REv. 561
(1950); Witherspoon, Why a New Commercial Code?, 54 Com. L.J. 291 (1949). The
articles cited do not constitute an exhaustive bibliography, but do contain some of the
most pointed arguments on each side of the controversy.
3. Figures on the number of checks normally handled by banks tend to indicate
that the most frequent disposition of a check is by deposit in the payee's or holder's
bank. Leary, Deferred Posting & Delayed Returns-the Current Check Collection
Problem, 62 HARv. L. REv. 905, 909 (1949). Questions are thus raised concerning the
movement of the check from bank to bank, through the collection process. This
institutional aspect of negotiable instruments problems must be recognized, but for
the purpose of clarity, this paper will treat check transactions as involving an individual
check.
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for acceptance to the drawee, by the drawer, payee, or holder, to enhance
its security and facilitate negotiation. The check is vulnerable to
chicanery while progressing toward the drawee.
After paying a defective instrument the drawee generally is un-
successful in attempting to charge the drawer's account.4 Ordinarily the
drawee must look to the presentor for recovery. Should the drawee re-
cover from a collecting bank that presented the check for payment, the
collecting bank can in turn go back against the forwarding bank,5
which may be able to charge its depositor's account.6 Thus, even where
the check has traveled through the bank collection system, the ultimate
liability usually rests upon an individual holder.
Section 3-418. Malefaction may occur in the drawing of a check
by forgery of a drawer's name. Obviously the person whose name has
been exploited without his sanction should not sustain any loss; neither
did he contribute to the misconduct of the forger nor could he have
thwarted it. A holder in due course who purchases the instrument is
likewise inculpable. As a matter of fact the only party who could detect
the imperfection, in most instances, is the drawee bank that pays the
check. A bank is in a position to know the authentic signature of de-
positors; upon receipt of a forged document a cursory inspection of bank
records should reveal the defect to the trained eye of the paying agent,
who can then refuse payment. Having paid, the bank must bear the loss.
This was the decision in the renowned English case, Price v. Neal,7
creating an exception to the general rule that the drawee can recover
from a person obtaining payment on a defective instrument. The same
principles inspired NIL Section 62, which adapts the Price v. Neal rule
4. Concerning payment of an altered instrument, obviously the depositor cannot
be liable for unauthorized payment by the drawee. As to forged indorsements, see
Jordan Marsh Co. v. National Shawmut Bank, 201 Mass. 397, 87 N.E. 740 (1909);
National Surety Co. v. President and Directors of Manhattan Co., 252 N.Y. 247, 169
N.E. 372 (1929). The result is the same where a drawee pays over the drawer's stop
order. Calamita v. Tradesmen's Nat. Bank, 135 Conn. 326, 64 A.2d 46 (1949) ; Speroff
v. First-Central Trust Co., 149 Ohio St. 415, 79 N.E.2d 119 (1948).
5. "Each holder may . . . recover in turn from his indorser...." Security
Savings Bank v. First National Bank, 106 F.2d 542, 545 (6th Cir. 1939).
6. Ibid.
7. 3 Burr. 1354, 97 Eng. Rep. 871 (1762). The rule of Price v. Neal is generally
applied in the United States. Bank of United States v. Bank of Georgia, 10 Wheat.
333 (U.S. 1825); Gloucester Bank v. Salem Bank, 17 Mass. 33 (1820); Frank v.
Chemical Nat. Bank, 84 N.Y. 209 (1881); Ames, The Doctrine of Price v. Neal, 4
.HAv. L. REv. 297 (1891).
An exception imposes liability upon a depositor where he could have learned
of the forgeries and prevented repetition of the forger's misconduct. First Nat. Bank v.
Allen, 100 Ala. 476, 14 So. 335 (1893). The court recognized a duty on the depositor
to carefully examine the checks periodically returned to him by his bank, and the
obligation to detect and report any errors, including forgeries.
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to the liability of an acceptor. ' Pv declaring that "payment or acceptance
of any instrument is final in favor of a holder in due course," Code
Section 3-418 reaffirms the opinion and the statute; a payor or acceptor
cannot retract upon discovering the forgery. A contributing factor may
have been a desire to assure permanence of check transactions and termi-
nation of the vitality of an instrument upon arrival at the drawee bank.
The finality in Section 3-418 is not without qualification.' 0 Ex-
ceptions are dependent upon the remaining hazards to which a check is
subject: forged indorsement of the name of the payee or a subsequent
holder; alteration in the body by changing the name of the payee or
raising the amount; and issuance of a stop payment order by the drawer.
In each instance, the drawee and the ultimate holder may be singularly
irreproachable. In the first two situations a miscreant has tampered with
the paper, sold it, and fled to a warmer climate. In the case of revocation
of payment the drawer is the acting party. The underlying problem re-
lates to the treatment of innocent parties as against one another. Can the
person obtaining payment retain it or enforce acceptance, or is the drawee,
upon later discovery of its error, entitled to recover funds mistakenly
paid out? Can a holder exact payment from a drawee reluctant to pay
on the instrument? A collateral inquiry is necessary to determine the
relative degree of innocence of each party.
Section 3-417(1). Resolution of the rights of the parties at present
depends upon a determination of whether or not the drawee should be
allowed to recover the payment made on a theory of money had and
received. A different legal device is utilized by Code Section 3-417(1),
that of imposing warranty obligations upon all presentors of the instru-
ment." Since this Section is unparalleled in any existing statute, a fair
8. "The acceptor ... admits-
"1. The existence of the drawer, the genuineness of his signature,
and his capacity and authority to draw the instrument;...."
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 62.
9. This provision also codifies the rule that the drawee must know the state of
the drawer's account, i.e., whether he has sufficient funds to pay the check. First Nat.
Bank v. Burkhardt, 100 U.S. 686 (1879); Smith v. Hubbard, 205 Mich. 44, 171 N.W.
546 (1919); Oddie v. National City Bank, 45 N.Y. 735 (1871).
10. ". .. [A]nd except for liability for breach of warranty on presentment under
the preceding section.... ." CODE § 3-418.
11. "(1) Unless otherwise agreed any person who obtains payment or acceptance
and any prior transferor warrants to a party who pays or accepts in good faith
"(a) that he has a good title to the instrument or is authorized
to obtain payment or acceptance on behalf of one who has a good
title; and
"(b) that he has no knowledge of any effective direction to stop
payment; and
"(c) that the instrument has not been materially altered, and that
he has no knowledge that the signature of the maker or drawer is
NOTES
analysis and evaluation is contingent upon estimation of its practical
effects as well as theoretical ramifications. Adoption of this provision
would affect banking institutions and their clientele throughout the
country.
A few general stipulations in Section 3-417(1) are worthy c E note.
The Section commences with "Unless otherwise agreed." The parties are
thus allowed freedom to contract out of the obligations imposed. Such
indulgence is readily acceptable in dealing with commercial paper; only
the parties immediately involved in a transaction are capable of determin-
ing the value of the paper with or without the warranties and thus bar-
gaining for their inclusion or exclusion. The warranties run to the drawee
from the presentor and "any prior transferor," in effect repudiating the
existing law that only the immediate presentor is subject to an action for
recovery of the money paid out by the drawee.12 Although proposed war-
ranties in a sale where transfer is by delivery do not run to subsequent
holders, 1 3 in a presentment situation such a provision is quite practical.
If a holder deposits a defective check in his bank for collection, neither
the depository bank nor a subsequent collecting bank should be liable to
the drawee; the obligation rightfully falls upon the holder, a "prior
transferor."'1 4 The paying or accepting bank receives the warranties in
Section 3-417(1) only if in "good faith." Payment or acceptance dis-
regarding knowledge of an infirmity in an instrument will bind a bank
notwithstanding a defect against which the presentor would otherwise
unauthorized, except that such warranties are not given by a holder in
due course who has taken a draft drawn on and accepted by a bank
after such alteration or signature or by a holder in due course of a note.
This exception applies even though a draft has been accepted 'payable as
originally drawn' or in equivalent terms."
CODE § 3-417 (1).
CODE § 4-207(1), in which "A customer warrants to his depository bank and a
customer and a collecting bank warrants to all subsequent intermediary banks and to
the payor," contains substantially the same warranties as CODE § 3-417(1). Article 4
governs the bank collection system.
12. The drawee cannot recover back against prior transferors because its action
is based on a quasi-contract theory, not a warranty running from prior transferors
to subsequent holders as established by NIL §§ 65, 66. See State Planters Bank &
Trust Co. v. Fifth-Third Union Trust Co., 56 Ohio App. 309, 10 N.E.2d 935 (1937).
13. This is true under both the NEGOTIABLE IN SRUimENTS LAW and the CODE.
... [Wihen the negotiation is by delivery only, the warranty extends in favor of no
holder other than the immediate transferee." NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 65.
". .. [A]ny party who transfers an instrument for consideration warrants to his
transferee.... ." CODE § 3-417(2).
14. The drawee is not prevented from acting against the immediate presentor;
in such case the presenting bank could go against his transferor and so on back
down the line of transfer to the holder. The burden of litigation can be decreased
by action directly against the holder.
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warrant. The Code fails to resolve the question whether or not negligence
precludes good faith. 15
Section 3-417(1) (b). Code Section 3-417 (1) (b) establishes a war-
ranty to the drawee that the presentor has "no knowledge of any effective
direction to stop payment." Enactment of this provision would dispel
the variegation presently existing in the law of the several American
jurisdictions. Whether the draftsmen have adopted the best formula
available can be questioned; they have relied solely on the hypothesis that
presentment with knowledge of a stop order is fraudulent on the part of
the presentor.
Numerically, the rule presently receiving the most widespread ap-
proval denies a bank recovery of funds inadvertently paid out over a
drawer's stop order when the person obtaining payment is a holder in
good faith and for value.16 Recovery cannot be grounded upon mutual
mistake; any discernible mistake is unilateral by the drawee and its
negligent employee who pays the holder. Banks are bound to know the
state of their depositor's account, including a revocation of payment.
Under this rule knowledge is only one factor in determining whether or
not the presentor acted in good faith; under Section 3-417 (1) (b) knowl-
edge is the only determinant. It is doubtful that this proposal is an
improvement.
Whatever advantage may be gained by the definiteness of this sub-
section is offset by its lack of flexibility. By using the presentor's knowl-
edge as the sole prerequisite to recovery by the payor, significant criteria
are eliminated. That is not to suggest, as held in National Loan &
Exchange Bank v. Lachovitz,17 that an innocent purchaser for value may
be under a duty of restitution simply because he is "charged with knowl-
edge" that payment of the instrument is subject to a condition that there
be no stop order. Nor should recovery be based entirely upon whether
or not the holder has changed his position, requiring some change to pre-
clude restitution.' Such requisites are excessively burdensome on the
holder; but, more should be required than lack of knowledge. The holder
should prove that he, or his depositor if the check has been deposited with
15. Negligence generally does not bar restitution under present law. National
Bank of Commerce v. National Mechanics' Banking Association, 55 N.Y. 211 (1873).
16. Bank of Moulton v. Rankin, 24 Ala. App. 110, 131 So. 450 (1930); National
Bank v. Berrall, 70 N.J.L. 757, 58 At. 189 (1904); National Commercial Bank &
Trust Co. v. Madison, 270 App. Div. 437, 60 N.Y.S.2d 832 (3d Dep't 1946); Miller
v. Chatham & Phoenix Nat. Bank, 126 Misc. 559, 214 N.Y. Supp. 76 (Sup. Ct. 1926);
Central Nat. Bank v. International Sales Co., 87 Ohio App. 207, 91 N.E. 532 (1950);
RESTATEmENT, RESTITUTION §§ 14, 33 (1937).
17. 131 S. C. 430, 128 S.E. 10 (1925).
18. Cf. Foster v. Federal Reserve Bank, 29 F. Supp. 716, 718 (E.D. Pa. 1939),
aff'd, 113 F.2d 326 (3d Cir. 1940).
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him for collection, is a purchaser for valid consideration. 19 He should
further specify that he has not been unjustly enriched by receipt of pay-
ment.2 0 When the presentor can warrant these things to the drawee, in
addition to his lack of knowledge of a stop payment order, then there
should be no obligation to repay money received on the check. The bank
should suffer the loss caused by its own negligence. Here again, the
concept of terminating the consequences of a negotiable instrument, when
it reaches the drawee, is served.
Section 3-417(1)(a). The warranty that the individual obtaining
payment or acceptance has a good title to the instrument retains the rule
that the drawee can recover from the presentor in the event that any
indorsement has been forged. 2 ' Security Savings Bank v. First National
Bank of Michigan City22 presents a typical situation: A Company pur-
chased goods from B Company; A's treasurer executed duplicate checks
in payment of some of B's invoices and forged B's indorsement; he then
surreptitiously deposited the checks in defendant bank in B's name, claim-
ing to be B's treasurer authorized to draw on the account; defendant-
forwarding bank relayed the paper to plaintiff, drawee bank, for col-
lection; unaware of the forged indorsements, plaintiff-drawee paid the
checks; upon discovery of the forgery plaintiff-drawee sued to recover
the money paid out. The court ordered restoration of the funds on
common law authority that the defendant-presentor represents the
genuineness of the instrument.2 3 Two bases for restitution were scruti-
nized: mutual mistake of fact and implied warranty.
The theory that the parties have made a mutual mistake of a ma-
terial fact is espoused by many cases in which a payor has reclaimed
money paid a presentor of a bill with a forged indorsement, 24 usually
without adequate exposition of the nature of the mistake. The only ap-
parent misunderstanding would be an assumption by both parties that all
indorsements are authorized and legitimate. Several courts have declared
that a holder impliedly warrants to the drawee that the indorsements are
19. In Murfreesboro Bank & Trust Co. v. Travis, 190 Tenn. 429, 230 S.W.2d 658
(1950), recovery was allowed because the check had been given to the holder in
discharge of a gambling debt, therefore he was not a holder for value.
20. At the time of presentment of the check for payment the holder knew the
debt had previously been paid in Smith & McCrorken v. Chatham Phenix Nat Bank
& Trust Co., 239 App. Div. 318, 267 N.Y.Supp. 153 (1st Dep't 1933). The drawee
bank was allowed to recover on an unjust enrichment theory.
21. Comment, p. 391.
22. 106 F.2d 542 (6th Cir. 1939).
23. Leather Manufacturers Nat Bank v. Merchants Nat Bank, 128 U.S. 26
(188) ; Yatesville Banking Co. v. Fourth Nat. Bank, 10 Ga. App. 1, 72 S.E. 528 (1911).
24. E.g., Allen v. Sharpe, 37 Ind. 67 (1871); National Bank of Commerce v.
National Mechanics' Banking Ass'n, 55 N.Y. 211 (1873); RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION
§ 35 (1937).
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genuine.2 5 Undoubtedly an express warranty exists when the presentor
indorses "prior indorsements guaranteed. ' 26  Since most checks passing
through the bank collection process are so guaranteed 2 7 ordinarily such
an express warranty is available under existing law. Lacking such volun-
tary undertaking, however, a warranty is difficult to establish. Indorsers'
warranties are prescribed in Sections 65 and 66, NIL.2  Since the
drawee is not a holder and instruments are not negotiated to him, he
cannot be protected by application of these sections. The presentor's sig-
nature merely indicates receipt of payment, not an indorsement from
which warranties may be implied .2
Without providing any theoretical basis, some judges have merely
proclaimed as law that a drawee does not concede the genuineness of
previous indorsements. 30 This widely accepted statement of the law may
be rationalized by distinguishing the factual background involved from
that of Price v. Neal. Although the payor or acceptor is presumed to
know the signature of the drawer, there is no occasion for acquaintance
with the handwriting of indorsers. Although a predilection for finality
of payment could have persuaded the drafters of the Code to deny re-
25. Wellington Nat. Bank v. Robbins, 71 Kan. 748, 81 Pac. 487 (1905); American
Exchange Nat. Bank v. Yorkville Bank, 122 Misc. 616, 204 N.Y.Supp. 621 (Sup. Ct.
1924), and cases cited therein.
26. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Savings Ass'n v. Security-First Nat. Bank,
32 Cal. App.2d 647, 90 P.2d 335 (1939); Second Nat. Bank v. Guarantee Trust &
Safe Deposit Co., 206 Pa. 616, 56 Atl. 72 (1903). Clearing house regulations generally
require such an indorsement. Andrews, The City Clearing House: Payment, Returns,
and Reimbursement, 27 I1D. L.J. 155, 173 (1952).
An unusual case has held that a drawee could not recover on an altered instru-
ment because the specific guarantee of prior indorsements excluded the possibility of
recovery on altered paper. Crocker-Woolworth Nat. Bank v. Nevada Bank, 139 Cal.
564, 73 Pac. 456 (1903). In a jurisdiction in which recovery is ordinarily allowed on
altered instruments, a guarantee of prior indorsements certainly should not hinder
such recovery. Andrews, supra, at 175.
See also Townsend, The Bank Collection Code of the American Bankers' Associa-
tion, 8 TULANE L. REv. 21, 36 (1933), for a criticism of BANK COLLECrTiON CODE § 4,
which treats such guarantees.
27. Andrews, supra note 26, at 173; BRITTOx, BILLS AND NoTES 649 (1943).
28. "Every person negotiating an instrument by delivery or by a qualified indorse-
ment, warrants-
"1. That the instrument is genuine.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAw § 65.
"Every indorser who indorses without qualification, warrants to all subsequent
holders in due course:
"1. The matters and things mentioned in subdivision one . . . of the next
preceding section;"
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAw § 66.
29. First Nat. Bank v. City Nat. Bank, 182 Mass. 130, 65 N.E. 24 (1902); First
Nat. Bank v. United States Nat. Bank, 100 Ore. 264, 197 Pac. 547 (1921).
30. Farmers' Bank & Trust Co. v. Farmers State Bank, 148 Ark. 599, 231 S.W. 7
(1921), and cases cited therein; National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Mellon Nat. Bank,
276 Pa. 212, 119 Atl. 910 (1923).
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covery from presentors, judicial experience favored the drawee. Also, if
the payor bank is made to bear the burden in every instance the economic
consequences may be more detrimental to the use of negotiable instru-
ments than permitting the drawee to reverse its original action and re-
cover the amount paid.
Under the Code provision recovery is based upon a warranty similar
to that presently imposed upon indorsers.31 The effect of recasting the
foundation of recovery is subject to speculation. Warranties are ordi-
narily appended to sales, whether of goods or paper. Presentment has
never been regarded as a sale to the drawee, and it is unlikely that the
Commissioners intended such an interpretation. 32 In all probability they
contemplated extension of the use of warranty beyond sale transactions.
This proposal is salutary in clearly delineating the basis of the drawee's
action and in revealing the possibility of recovering any consequential
damages suffered. 33 The prospect of recovery may also be increased by
elimination of the quasi-contractual defense of material change of po-
sition now available to a presentor.3 4
Section 3-417(1)(c). Treatment of the problem of altered instru-
ments in Section 3-417(1) (c) of the Code parallels the disposition of the
forged indorsement cases in the previous clause.35 Decisions at common
law and under the NIL usually subscribed to the proposition that a payor
could recover money paid to the presentor of materially altered paper.3 6
31. Compare CODE § 3417(1) (a), supra note 11, with NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
LAw §§ 65, 66, supra note 28.
32. This view may be substantiated by CODE § 3-504, which defines presentment
as "a demand for acceptance or payment." Thus, the concept of presentment has not
been modified.
33. If analogy can be drawn to warranties in sales of goods the warrantor will
be liable for all damages reasonably within the contemplation of the parties. Cf.
Dushane v. Benedict, 120 U.S. 630 (1886) ; Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, Inc.,
255 N.Y. 388, 175 N.E. 105 (1931); Brown v. Chicago, M. & St P. Ry., 54 Wis. 342,
11 NW. 356 (1882).
34. WOODWARD, QUASI CONTRACTS §§ 25, 26 (1913). Whether or not this conse-
quence is conducive to justice is arguable.
35. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW §§ 124 and 125 define a material alteration and
prescribe its effect upon the liability of a maker, drawer, and indorser. These sections
are combined and modified in CODE § 3-407, which provides that "(1) Any alteration
of an instrument is material which changes the contract of any party thereto in any
respect, including any such change in (a) the number or relations of the parties; or
(b) an incomplete instrument, by completing it otherwise than as authorized; or (c)
the writing as signed, by adding to it or by removing any part of it." CODE § 3-406
introduces the effect of a party's negligence in contributing to a material alteration.
The problem of incomplete instruments is handled separately from variations in
the name of the payee or amount of the instrument in both the NIL and the CODE. See
NEGOTlAMLE INSTaUMENTS LAW §§ 14, 15, 52(1); CODE § 3-115.
36. Interstate Trust Co. v. United States Nat Bank, 67 Colo. 6, 185 Pac. 260
(1919); McClendon v. Bank of Advance, 188 Mo. App. 417, 174 S.W. 203 (1915);
Bank of Commerce v. Union Bank, 3 Comst. 230 (N.Y. 1850).
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The only prerequisite was a prompt request for redemption upon dis-
covery of a discrepancy.3 7
The extant rule allowing recovery of money paid out on an altered
instrument has been incorporated into the Code, but the legal basis has
been modified. Rather than affirming the payor's right to recover in
quasi-contract for money paid out under mutual mistake of material fact,
Section 3-417(1) (c) imposes upon the presentor, and prior transferors,
the obligation to warrant to the drawee "that the instrument has not
been materially altered." Upon detection of an alteration a drawee who
has paid the face amount of a check could presumably recover any excess
over the original amount (or, if alteration is of the payee's name, the
entire payment) as damages for breach of warranty. An exception to the
present rule was made in United States v. National Exchange Bank.3 8
Since the Federal Government was both drawer and drawee of the in-
strument involved, it was bound to know the contents of the check and
could not recover as a drawee from an innocent holder. Immensity of
operations conferred no immunity from responsibility. Under the Code
a drawee would probably receive the presentor's warranties regardless
of the fact that he is also drawer. Since the permutation from previous
law and the considerations involved are identical, the observations made
above relative to forged indorsements are applicable here to altered
instruments.8 9
When a negotiable instrument is presented for acceptance or certi-
fication, some perplexing questions are raised.4 0  If the amount of a
check is increased after certification, the certifying bank cannot be held
liable for the excess over the original figure.41 The bank has no more
control over the instrument than a drawer has after delivering a check
to the payee; and, as the drawer is not liable for more than the amount
he has ordered paid, so the drawee need not pay more than the amount
certified.
The situation may be different, however, where the modification
occurred prior to the acceptance. A preponderance of authority favors
the rule limiting liability to the holder even when an instrument is certi-
fied as changed, on the ground that the acceptor only agrees that the
drawer's signature is genuine and that he has sufficient funds deposited
37. The payor has a reasonable time to detect the forgery and demand resti-
tution; what is a reasonable time depends upon the particular circumstances of each
case. Third Nat. Bank v. Allen, 59 Mo. 310 (1875).
38. 1 F.2d 888 (4th Cir. 1924), aff'd, 270 U.S. 527 (1926).
39. See notes 31-34 supra, and accompanying text.
40. Certification is equivalent to acceptance under NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW
§ 187 and CODE § 3-411.
41. Ozark Savings Bank v. Bank of Bradleyville, 204 S.W. 570 (Mo. App. 1918).
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with the drawee to meet the instrument, not that the body of the bill is
genuine.42 But a pair of notable decisions, National City Bank v. Na-
tional Bank of the Republic43 and Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co.
v. Bank of Italy,44 have contradicted the position of the majority. In
each of these cases, a forger altered the name of the original payee, the
instruments were then accepted by the plaintiff bank and were later paid
as certified. Recovery was not allowed against the holders in due course
who received payment of the instruments. Construing Section 62 of
the NIL literally, the courts ruled that an acceptor agrees to pay the
instrument precisely as it appears at the time of certification. 45 Emphasis
was placed upon the fact that the presentors were innocent holders in due
course who had purchased the instruments in reliance upon the ac-
ceptance. These decisions, imposing strict liability upon a drawee who
accepts or certifies a bill or check, have been codified as exceptions to the
general rule of Section 3-417(1) (c). 4 6
Criticisms of the National City Bank and the Wells Fargo cases can
be utilized in evaluating the Code provision ordaining these decisions as
law. The principal technical attack on them was based upon sections
of the NIL-disregarded by the Illinois and California courts-which
are thought to conflict with a strict interpretation of Section 62.
In accepting a bill the drawee assents to "the order of the drawer,"
according to NIL Section 132. Thus, the contention is that an acceptor
cannot be held liable for material variations not made by the drawer.
Though perhaps a valid objection to the cases, this argument has been
dealt with by Section 3-410(1) of the Code, which defines acceptance as
the drawee's "engagement to honor the draft as presented."
4 7
Professor Greeley, also dissenting from the minority rule established
by the two cases, suggested that, in the light of previous usage, the
phrase, "according to the tenor of his acceptance" in Section 62, NIL,
42. Co €oN LAW: Parke v. Roser, 67 Ind. 500 (1879); Security Bank v. Na-
tional Bank of the Republic, 67 N.Y. 458 (1876).
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 62: National Reserve Bank v. Corn Exchange
Bank, 171 App. Div. 195, 157 N.Y. Supp. 316 (1st Dep't 1916).
Cases after adoption of NIL, but not citing it: Interstate Trust Co. v. United
States Nat. Bank, 67 Colo. 6, 185 Pac. 260 (1919) ; Central Nat. Bank v. F. W. Drosten
Jewelry Co., 203 Mo. App. 646, 220 S.W. 511 (1920); McClendon v. Bank of Advance,
188 Mo. App. 417, 174 S.W. 203 (1915).
43. 300 Ill. 103, 132 N.E. 832 (1921).
44. 214 Cal. 156, 4 P.2d 781 (1931).
45. "The acceptor by accepting the instrument engages that he will pay it ac-
cording to the tenor of his acceptance;" (Italics added). NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
LAW § 62.
46. ... . [S]uch warranties are not given by a holder in due course who has taken
a draft drawn on and accepted by a bank after such alteration...." CODE § 3-417(1) (c).
47. Italics added,
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should be construed to mean "according to whether the acceptance is
general or qualified." 48 In Wells Fargo the phrase was interpreted to
refer to the condition of the instrument when accepted. Professor
Greeley's contention is met by Code Section 3-413(1), prescribing the
acceptor's obligation. Though obscure in retaining a promise to pay the
instrument "according to its tenor," the provision lucidly annexes "at the
time of his engagement." The Code thus makes it clear that upon cer-
tifying a check the drawee bank becomes liable to pay the face amount
at the time of certification to any innocent holder.
Among the methods banks devised for protection against the conse-
quences of the Wells Fargo rule is the use of a qualified acceptance, i.e.,
"payable as originally drawn." Section 3-417(1) (c) specifically negates
the utility of such terms. Refusal to certify, forgery insurance, use of
special paper making alterations obvious, and a greater amount of vigi-
lance are to be the safeguards available after enactment of the Code.
The question remains whether such burdens can justifiably be placed
upon a drawee, sometimes handling as many as 700,000 checks in one
business day.49 A bank, in certifying a check, performs a gratuitous
service to the depositor; there is no obligation to certify.50 The presentor,
on the other hand, has likely profited from the transaction, and, fre-
quently, has trusted the fraudulent party. A bill altered after acceptance
may be relied on by a purchaser as readily as one changed before, yet in
the former instance the holder is never protected. 51 A drawee paying an
instrument acquires a more favorable position than one who accepts
under the minority rule, thus discouraging acceptance. Finally, where
an original indorsement is forged an accepting bank can recover,52 while
recovery is restricted where the original payee's name is replaced and then
the bill is indorsed as modified.
In the face of these facts, is there justification for exempting a
presentor from warranting to a payor that there have been no alterations
of the accepted bill prior to acceptance? The continued use of the certi-
fied check as a document of commercial utility resembling cash demands
an affirmative answer. Although certification is gratuitous, the bank is
operating for profit and can be expected to assume certain business risks
48. Greeley discussed NIL §§ 139 to 142 and English and American text-writers
in reaching this conclusion. Greeley, The Effect of Acceptance of an Altered Bill, 27
ILL. L. REv. 519 (1933).
49. Leary, supra note 3, at 909.
50. Wachtel v. Rosen, 249 N.Y. 386, 164 N.E. 326 (1928) ; CoDE § 3-411 (2).
51. Ozark Savings Bank v. Bank of Bradleyville, 204 S.W. 570 (Mo. App. 1918).
52. Leather Manufacturers Nat. Bank v. Merchants Nat. Bank, 128 U.S. 26
(1888) ; Security Savings Bank v. First Nat. Bank, 106 F.2d 542 (6th Cir. 1939) ; Allen
v. Sharpe, 37 Ind. 67 (1871) ; National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Mellon Nat. Bank, 276
Pa. 212, 119 Atl. 910 (1923).
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the cost of which can be passed on to all customers. When a check is
varied after acceptance the bank has not certified the alteration; but
certification after the alteration may be characterized as assent to the
change. More importantly, there is a vital distinction between making
payment and accepting an instrument; a certified check may be relied
upon by a payee or subsequent holder, while a check after payment is
dead. Certification serves a useful purpose only by magnifying the
security of a check, so that a high degree of negotiability can be
obtained.53
The Commissioners, in codifying the minority rule, may have been
influenced by a feeling that a similarity to Price v. Neal justifies achieving
finality of payment in this area. By employing more careful detection
procedures, certifying banks could often prevent the situation in which
the holder of a check altered before acceptance is placed. Evidence of
this belief is the fact that the Wells Fargo rule was not extended to
certification of checks bearing forged indorsements.54 The only ap-
parent distinction between forged indorsements and alterations, insofar
as recovery by an acceptor from a holder is concerned, is that ordinarily
detection of alterations is much easier than is discovery of forged in-
dorsements.
Although Section 3-417(1) is only one small element of the entire
proposed Uniform Code, it indicates progress toward a modern body of
rules of commercial law. All critical problems may not be resolved, but
this Section surely eliminates some and decreases the breadth of others.
Codification of the Wells Fargo rule represents an extension of the
finality of payment concept initiated by Price v. Neal and pursued in
stop payment order cases. An increased desire for cessation of the
consequences of negotiable instruments at a specific time or place could
conceivably lead to further extension of the drawee's liability where a
bank has paid in ignorance of a forged indorsement or material altera-
tion. If this were ever to occur, the original doctrine shall have been com-
pletely reversed. The Code Commissioners exhibited a natural reluctance
to accomplish the total overthrow of an established principle. Moreover,
the .economic effect of shifting the burden of loss to the drawee in all
cases where loss must fall upon an innocent drawee or holder remains in
the realm of speculation. After enactment of the Code, reaction of banks
to the imposition of additional liability upon them may provide an
effective forecast of the future of the finality concept.
53. See Steffen and Starr, A Blue Print for the Certified Check, 3 N.C.L. REv.
450 (1935).
54. See Bpurox, BILLS AND NOTES 658 (1943).
